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Article 1

Symposium
Association of American Law Schools,
Annual Meeting,
Evidence Section Program

The Politics of [Evidence]
Rulemaking*
Recent changes to federal evidence law, such as new rules on the
admissibility of a defendant's prior sexual conduct and amendments
to the rules regarding expert testimony, have highlighted the political
aspects of procedural rulemaking. This panel grappled with questions
such as the following: who should make the evidence rules-the
judiciary, the legislature, the executive? What role should the
practicing bar, law professors and the general public play in the
creation of the rules of evidence? What is the proper function of the
Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee-to codify case law,
to develop rules and amendments to respond to criticism of existing
case law, or to develop solutions to evidentiary problems unforeseen
by the original drafters? Are there special considerations that apply
to evidence law that do not apply at least to the same degree, to other
civil or criminal rules of procedure?
The panelists brought rich experience and qualifications to the
questions discussed. Judge Fern Smith is a Federal District Court
Judge for the Northern District of California. She served as a
member of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee from
its re-inception in 1993, serving as Chair from 1996 to 1999, when she
assumed her current duties as the Director of the Federal Judicial
Center. Professor Kenneth Broun and Mr. Gregory P. Joseph also
served as members of the Advisory committee from 1993 to 1999.
Professor Broun now serves the Advisory Committee as Consultant
to the Subcommittee on Privileges. In addition to his service on the
Advisory Committee, Mr. Joseph has served as the Chair of the
* Presented January 5,2002 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
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Litigation Section of the American Bar Association and as the ABA
advisor to the Uniform Rules of Evidence Committee of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Professor
Laird Kirkpatrick recently served as the Department of Justice
representative to the Advisory Committee and has had experience in
the development of state evidence rules. Professor Paul Rice, who is
the Director of the Evidence Project at American University, has
been a persistent critic of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee and
the current federal rulemaking process.
Professor Eileen A. Scallen, Professor of Law at William
Mitchell College of Law, served as moderator of the panel. The panel
was conducted as an interactive discussion among panelists and
audience members. Thus, the comments in the transcript here retain
their less formal and extemporaneous quality.
Eileen Scallen: Let me introduce myself. I am Eileen Scallen
from William Mitchell College of Law and this is the Evidence
Section program on the Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking. The
phrase "evidence" is in brackets because one issue for discussion is
this: Are we just talking about rulemaking in general or are evidence
rules somehow special? We debated broadening this panel to include
people from the Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, rules, etc., but
ultimately ended up thinking we could do a better job keeping it
focused on the rules of evidence. So, we welcome your input on this
issue of whether evidence rules are somehow "special."
Let me talk to you about the format of today's program. The
panelists and I all talked via e-mail and concluded that we are a little
bit tired of the "talking head" kind of presentations. We thought we
would try something a little bit more interactive and different. So, we
are going to adopt the talk show "Oprah" model. We're going to
hope that it doesn't turn into "Jerry Springer," but you never know.
But we'll try to keep everybody in good health and good spirits.
I'll spend about an hour posing questions to the panelists, maybe
asking some follow-up questions. And the panelists will be asking
each other questions and responding to each other's comments as we
go along. But we are going to try to limit that part of the program to
about an hour so that for the last part of the session, which will go all
the way to 12:15, I can come to you with the mike and have you ask
questions of our panelists.
Let me go ahead, in the spirit of these things, and introduce our
distinguished guests for today. We are very lucky to have a wonderful
group. First of all on my left is Judge Fern Smith who is a U.S.
District Court Judge for the Northern District of California in San
Francisco but currently, since 1999, she is serving as the Director of
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the Federal Judicial Center.! We are very happy to have her here. As
the program indicates, she not only served as a member of the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee, but also served as chair for a
number of years and presented the most recent packages of rules that
were ultimately approved, including the expert testimony rule
codification. So, she has very interesting things to say.
Professor Paul Rice from American University has been a
persistent critic of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee. He is the Director of the Evidence Project, that I am
sure he will tell you something about, at American. He has written
not just on these issues of rulemaking but extensively about evidence
law and specifically attorney-client privilege. Most recently, he has
been "blowing the whistle" in his book on The Best Kept Evidence
Secrets.
After Professor Rice is Professor Laird Kirkpatrick, who is
currently a professor at the University of Oregon but who is going to
be a visiting professor during spring semester, 2002, at one of my old
haunts, the University of California, Hastings. Professor Kirkpatrick,
of course, has written extensively on evidence law with and without
his evidence casebook co-author Chris Mueller
Professor
Kirkpatrick is also on this panel because he served in a special
capacity as the Department of Justice representative on the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee. So, he has had the interesting experience
of being both a law professor and being the Department of Justice
representative. He'll talk about that.
To bring us down to earth, next in line on our panel is Greg
Joseph, who, despite his youthful appearance, is an amazing
individual.4 He is a certified trial lawyer and has litigated cases from
1. The views expressed by Judge Smith here are her own and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Federal Judicial Center, the United States Supreme Court or other
members of the federal judiciary.
2. Professor Rice is a professor of law and Director of the Evidence Project at the
American University Washington College of Law. Recently, he has authored BEST KEPT
SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAW: 101 PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES & PITFALLS (Anderson
2001); EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (LEXIS 4th

ed. 2000); ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES (West Group 2d ed.
1999); and ATtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW (Rice Publishing 2001), available
at http://vww.acprivilege.com.
3. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES (4th ed. 2000); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1999).

4. Mr. Joseph is a member of the American College of Trial Lawyers and former
Chair of the 60,000-member Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association. By
appointment of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, he served on the Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Evidence from 1993-99. He also served as Chair of the New York
State Courts' Committee of Lawyers to Enhance the Jury Process, by appointment of New
York Chief Judge Judith Kaye. He formerly chaired the Litigation Department at Fried,

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

your basic tort cases to your most complex securities actions. But
unlike most practitioners, he somehow finds the time to be active in
the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, having served as a member,
and has also served as a liaison to the Uniform Rules of Evidence
group and all sorts of other law reform groups. He has written
extensively on visual evidence-modern visual evidence-and other
evidence topics. So, where he finds his time I don't know. One of my
favorite Minnesota lawyers refers to you, Greg, as a "heavy hitter."
From a state that elected Jesse "the Body" Ventura, the wrestler, as
our governor, that's high praise. So, you are our "heavy hitter."
Our "clean-up" batter in the panelist line-up is Professor Ken
Broun from the University of North Carolina, who, in addition to
having serving on the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee in the
past, is now a consultant to the Committee on a project of codifying
the law of privilege That's a fascinating project because, as those of
you who are familiar with the history of the Federal Rules of
Evidence know, privilege was one of the sore spots when the rules
were originally codified. So we'll talk to him about his project.
With that, I'm going to launch into my first question, which is
directed at Judge Smith. You were a member, then you were the
Chair, of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee. How
does the Committee pick which rules to create and which rules to
amend-how does it work?
Judge Fern Smith: Well, it's sort an amorphous system where
information drifts into the Committee from a variety of places. First
of all, the Committee is very diverse in terms of its members. It is
made up of a combination of federal judges, a state court (usually)
justice, somebody from the Department of Justice, a public defender,
lawyers, and academics. The Reporter on the Committee is
incredibly influential. I think, while one might assume from Professor
Rice's article that the Chair really directs and controls everything, I
would suggest that the Reporter is the most important person on the
Committee. Because the reporters are always academics, it is their
job to keep track of what is going on out there in law review articles,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson in New York. He is currently Co-Chair of the Third
Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel by appointment of Chief Judge Edward
Becker. Mr. Joseph is also a widely published author of several books and articles,
including CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE (2d ed. 2000); MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE

(1984 & Supp. 2001); SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (3d ed.
2000); and EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES (1987 & Supp.
1994) (four volumes) (co-author with Stephen A. Saltzburg). A full bibliography of his
work is available at his law firm website http://josephnyc.lawoffice.com.
5. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (5th ed.
2000); KENNETH S. BROUN, PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE (4th ed. 2000).

6. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-TestimonialPrivileges
and the FederalRules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (2002).
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in cases, etc., and to bring problem areas to our attention. People like
Greg who are in the courts come and say, "you know there is a real
problem that I see in the courts."
So, things come in and we say, "is there a real problem here?" If
there is, then we talk about what we might be able to do to ameliorate
it. Now, when I first was on the Committee as a member, we went
through the entire Rules of Evidence, every section, talking about
whether the section was working well, or was it not working well. We
picked out various sections that we felt weren't working well and
went from there.
Let me give you an example: As the Dauberttrilogy 7 came out,
there was of course a lot of talk about whether the rules on expert
evidence ought to be changed. The decision was made to basically
see what the case law did with those cases first. Was it going to be a
problem? Was it not? Should we meddle? Or shouldn't we? We
waited for several years and then it became obvious that there was a
problem. There were a lot of conflicts among the circuits. So we
thought we had a contribution to make by trying to amend those rules
to be a little more certain-to give more guidance-to both lawyers
and trial judges. That's what we did.
Now, I think it is important to understand, if I can take a couple
of minutes, how the process works. The Advisory Committee is just
the starting point.
Scallen: Yes, would you explain that to us because I explain this
every year to my students, and they glaze over. Hopefully, this group
is more interested.
Judge Smith: I can understand. I glazed over until I got on the
Evidence Committee. The rulemaking process is not something that
many trial judges give a whole lot of attention to, frankly.
Basically, the rulemaking provisions are set forth in Title 28,
2071-2077. s
Scallen: Let me interrupt you for one second. There are papers
back there. It's a paper that's written by Paul Rice but in the
footnotes you will find a lot of these relevant portions of the Rules
Enabling Act that Judge Smith is talking about.
Judge Smith: Thank you. And these are generally all part of the
Rules Enabling Act.9 In that Act, Congress basically said that the
Supreme Court and all of the courts established by acts of Congress

7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
8. Rules of Procedure & Evidence, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2001).
9. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2001)(Originally enacted as Act of June 29,
1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, codified as revised at 28 U.S.C. § 2072-2074).
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could make their own rules to a certain extent. That's section 2071.
And, I'm going to summarize these statutes very briefly.
Then it went on to say in section 2072 that the Supreme Court
shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and the rules of evidence for the United States courts.
Section 2073 talks about the method of doing that. It basically
says that the Judicial Conference shall prescribe and publish the
procedures that are used in that rulemaking process. It goes on to say
that while the Judicial Conference "shall," using mandatory language,
authorize appointment of a Standing Committee on Practice and
Procedure, the Judicial Conference "may," that is, in its discretion,
appoint other committees to help out.
So, that's where the Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Evidence comes in. We're the "may" group. Basically we can be
wiped out anytime the Judicial Conference thinks that we're not
appropriate or not helping.
It's important to understand that the Evidence Committee, or
any of the Advisory Committees, are simply a beginning point. When
we make a recommendation it goes first to the Judicial Conference's
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. If they
approve it for public hearing, then there are public hearings at which
the public, anyone really, is invited to comment. Then, if the
Standing Committee at a later time approves our proposed change, it
goes to the Judicial Conference. If they approve it, the proposal goes
to the Supreme Court and if the Court approves it then it goes to
Congress.
Scallen: Can I interrupt you for just one point on that. For
people interested in teaching any kinds of these issues, or doing
scholarship on these issues, both the Federal Judicial Center's
website ° and the U.S. Court's website n have a very clear and very
accessible description of the rulemaking process that Judge Smith is
summarizing.
The web sites contain an amazing wealth of
information that used to be very hard to access, such as all the
minutes of the Advisory Committee meetings, as well as notes and
archives of all sorts of past documents that have been created or used,
not just by the Evidence Rules Committee but also by the Civil Rules
Committee, the Bankruptcy Rules, the Appellate Rules, and Criminal
Procedure Rules. So, for those of you who find this stuff interesting,
as we do, I highly recommend those web sites. They are terrific.
Judge Smith: Thank you for the plug. We appreciate it. I just
want to make one other comment. I think it is important to put in the

10. The Federal Judicial Center's website is http://www.fjc.gov.
11. The United States Judiciary's website is http://www.uscourts.gov.
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context of how we're viewing this and in thinking about Professor
Rice's article.12
The rulemaking process, like the judiciary itself, is inherently
conservative. When I say that I don't mean Republican/Democrat
conservative. I mean that we are resistant to change. The judiciary
doesn't jump in and change the law every time somebody looks
around. That's why cases aren't overturned easily. And that's also
why rules aren't amended easily. If you start from the bottom, which
is where I consider the Advisory Committee to be, then you go to the
Standing Committee, but the Standing Committee is more
conservative about change than the Advisory Committee. Then a
proposal goes to the Judicial Conference, which is more conservative
about change than the Standing Committee. Then finally it goes to
the Supreme Court, which is probably the most conservative of all,
regardless of who may be the Chief Justice at a given time. However,
it is very rare that the Supreme Court will object to a rule amendment
that has been approved by the Judicial Conference.
It is a time consuming, very slow process. By the time you work
through the amendment you want to propose, it goes to the Standing
Committee, they decide if it is even worth public hearing, you go to
public hearings, you come back to the Standing Committee-it's a
matter of a couple of years-two to three years at a minimum from
start to finish. So, that's how it works.
Scallen: I want to follow up with a kind of an awkward question,
but it fits into the theme of this conference which is "Recommitting to
Teaching and Scholarship." One of the questions I always have as a
legal scholar is, does evidence scholarship matter? Does legal
scholarship help your Committee at all?
Judge Smith: I think it depends on the scholarship. If you were
to say to me, does an article that has some empirical evidence
suggesting that a particular rule of evidence isn't working, that there
are an increasing number of reversals based on a particular rule of
evidence, that there is a serious conflict among the circuits about the
way a rule of evidence is viewed, is that helpful? Sure. Those are the
kinds of things that the reporters bring to our attention very quickly
and that we take very seriously.
If there is an article by a professor saying, "woulda, coulda,
shoulda"--"if I had written them I would have done it differently"does that have a lot of influence? Probably not. Not unless the
article is followed up by some bar groups and judges saying, "hey, you

12. Paul R. Rice, "The Politics of Rule-Making" Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Tending to the Past and Pretendingfor the Future?, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
817 (2002).
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know she has a good idea, it should have been done differently."
Would we then think about it? Yes.
Scallen: Speaking of "woulda, coulda, shoulda," one of the most
frequent writers in that vein is Paul Rice. I'm going to turn to you at
this point, Paul, now that we've had an introduction. We've heard
that while things start with the Advisory Committee, it truly is just the
beginning. The Advisory Committee has to answer not only to the
Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference, but also to the
Judicial Conference as a whole and then, ultimately, to the Supreme
Court. So, your scholarship has been very critical of the Advisory
Committee's unwillingness to propose changes to the evidence rules.
How do you want to respond to the argument that, given this
rulemaking process, change will be conservative and slow?
Paul Rice: First of all, if change doesn't start it doesn't go. If the
Advisory Committee doesn't draft it, a change doesn't go to anybody.
Because the rulemaking power has been delegated to such a degree,
the Advisory Committee is on the bottom of the totem pole, but it has
to start there to go anywhere. My problem is that they don't start
enough changes there so that many problems have been left
unaddressed even from the time the code was initially enacted. There
are articles of the Federal Rules of Evidence that have never been
touched by the Advisory Committee. I don't blame the more current
Advisory Committee as much as those to whom the Federal Rules of
Evidence were assigned initially-the Criminal and Civil Procedure
Committees. It was sort of the unwanted step-sister that got very
little attention in those committees. Since that time, however, there
still has been no action on a number of articles. The Advisory
Committee has to take a broader view of what their responsibility is.
The reason that I say this is because the scholarship that is not
being given serious attention by the Advisory Committee is my
scholarship-the Evidence Project Report. It consisted of 350 pages,
written by about 45 people who worked on it for two years. When the
Report was virtually summarily dismissed in toto-and we were
warned that this was going to happen by members of the Advisory
Committee before we even wrote it-the decision was, "well, maybe
we should go to the body that the Advisory Committee is silently
telling us we should go to. If we want major things to happen, we
should go to Congress."
Well, Congress doesn't do this kind of work any more. Congress
took the common law power of the judges away to create new rules
when they codified the Federal Rules of Evidence. The members of
Congress had this entire code produced, but they didn't want to
maintain it. However, under the Rules Enabling Act, beginning in
the 1930s with the Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress delegated
rulemaking to the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference of the
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United States, which then delegated it to a Standing Committee on
Practice and Procedures, which then in turn delegated it to an
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence. Well, the Advisory
Committee doesn't have anybody to delegate it to. So, change is
going to have to start there.
Actually, in many instances, change doesn't start there because
of the Committee's very limited view of their responsibility to
maintain the rules. The Committee construes its role very narrowly.
The Chief Justice, who appoints all the members of the Advisory
Committee, apparently does not want anything that looks like law
reform and appoints people who will agree wvith this limited role. So,
the Advisory Committee is composed of people who have agreed, by
accepting the position I assume, that they will follow the very limited
interpretation of what their responsibilities are.
Scallen: Can I ask you a follow-up question at this point? When
you say Congress is out of the act of rulemaking, how can you say that
in light of Rules 413, 414 and 415,13 which Congress promulgated and
passed into law, despite virtually unanimous opposition by evidence
scholars and the Judicial Conference?'
Rice:
Yes, the Advisory Committee opposed Molinari's
revisions-yeah. 5
Scallen: Well how can you say that Congress is out of the
picture? Congress seems very interested in these evidence issues.
Rice: Members of Congress are interested in the issues that are
politically sensitive, that has a constituency that they think they can
get some votes from. That's the only reason Molinari proposed Rules
413-415. When former President Reagan was shot and the defendant
was tried, the Washington Post and other national papers as well as
members of Congress talked about what a circus the trial was. They
had to act to counter the public circus that went on in the courtroom.
I don't believe it was a circus, but they thought it was, so we got Rule
704(b). 6
It is only in instances like that that we are able to get them
involved. The congressmen and senators that our Evidence Project
13. FED. R. EVID. 413 (Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases); FED. R.
EVID. 414 (Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases); FED. R. EVID. 415
(Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual Assault or Child Molestation).
14. This exchange is in regard to Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, which
were passed by Congress as direct legislation, as opposed to the Rules Enabling Process.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (Sept. 13,
1994).
15. The sponsor and chief advocate for these rules was House of Representatives
member Susan Molinari. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994).
16. FED. R. EVID. 704 (Opinion on Ultimate Issue). FED. R. EVID. 704(b) was added
by Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 406, 98 Stat. 2067 (1984).
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Report went to, were from very good backgrounds, lawyers with very
good educations, but they said, "you know, we didn't understand
evidence really well in law school, and we don't understand it now.
We really won't get involved in revising rules that we don't fully
understand and would not know the implications of." I appreciated
their candor, but I was disappointed that we couldn't get them to
actually help us. They said quite frankly, "there is no constituency
that this appeals to. For us to go in and look at expert witness rules,
or look at presumptions, well, we don't have anybody that cares about
that. That doesn't get one vote for us."
Gregory Joseph: Oh? Congress has not had a series of bills on
expert witness rules, emanating from Daubert7 which were so
confused that they tried to both codify Daubert and codify Frye8
simultaneously?
Are you suggesting that they did not essentially force the
Advisory Committee into taking action on the question of the
admissibility of evidence of the character of a victim, when it is
introduced by a criminal defendant, so that there would be some
reciprocity? That Congress did not force the Advisory Committee to
act to prevent a Congressional atrocity-because those young people
doing Congress' drafting don't have any idea what they are doing?
Rice: No, I'm suggesting on a very limited basis that Congress
does get involved when they either think they will get votes, or there
is an interest group that is strong enough and supports it...
Joseph: But they won't get involved when, for example, from
your article, the question is whether the ancient document rule ought
to be in Rule 803 or 801?19

They won't get involved when the question is whether or not
Rule 70320 somehow prevents doctors or other experts from giving
testimony, or permits testimony they couldn't otherwise give,
because, for example, the x-ray hasn't been admitted? They don't get
interested in questions like whether, because Rule 70421 only
precludes experts from giving opinions regarding a person's mental
state, that somehow lay people are permitted to do? They aren't
interested in those questions?
Rice: No, I'm saying Congress generally will not get involved in
an overview of the code. They don't want to stay involved in it. They
will, on a limited basis, make recommendations-as was done with
the Molinari amendments, which are now Federal Rules of Evidence
17. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
18. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19. FED. R. EVID. 803 (Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial);
FED. R. EVID. 801 (Definitions).
20. FED. R. EVID. 703 (Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts).
21. Fed. R. Evid. 704 (Opinion on Ultimate Issue).
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413-15, the rules admitting character evidence of sex offenders. The
Advisory Committee initially rejected those proposed rules, so
Representative Molinari tacked them on as amendments to another
piece of legislation.
Scallen: Okay, Ken Broun wants to get into the fray.
Ken Broun: I was going to make the same point that Greg did in
terms of Congress' heavy involvement in the expert witness rules.
But, isn't it just as likely that Congress is not getting involved because
the changes you say are needed are because those evidence rules
don't teach as well as they otherwise would, that our students have
trouble understanding them? But in fact, the courts are applying
these rules consistently and reasonably. Perhaps Congress isn't
getting involved and the Rules Committee isn't getting involved
because the rules are essentially working-whether or not they are as
artistically drawn as we might like.
Rice: No, I wouldn't agree with that. On the issue of expert
witnesses, I think it is one of the articles that needs the most
attention.
There are issues in those rules that the Advisory
Committee has never addressed.
One of the issues is the admissibility of the basis of expert
,witnesses' opinions. The current rule appears to come from doctors
being able to rely on medical history and causation when they would
give a diagnosis in the courtroom and could recite the medical history
and causal factors leading to the doctor's opinion, but the testimony
didn't come in for its truth. There was a question about the
educational background of such experts-whether they ought to be
able to rely on that.
The rule we came up with allows experts to rely on adjudicative
facts that are involved in the resolution of a dispute, that under the
current rule, the jury never gets to hear. Or, if they get to hear this
evidence, under the new revisions of the rule, it is only if the
proponent can show that the probative value of the evidence
substantially outweighs the potential prejudice. By doing this, by
allowing experts to rely on adjudicative facts not before the jury, we
are changing the roles of the people in the trial.
In many cases, and I can speak to patent cases, since I consult a
bit in those cases, it is very clear that the experts would not reach the
conclusions they are reaching-and encouraging the jurors to reachwithout that additional inadmissible evidence. So essentially, the
proponents of expert testimony under the current rule are asking the
jury to accept a conclusion which the experts wouldn't accept if they
were on the jury because the jury won't be permitted to hear and
evaluate the additional evidence.
Scallen: Okay, Paul. I'm sure we will get into the specifics of
certain rules, especially in questions from the audience. At this point,

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

let's think of an alternative rulemaking scenario, where Congress
alone makes the evidence rules.
I assume you know that one problem the Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules faced last year was its own possible extinction. It
is pretty well known among some circles that the Advisory
Committee was almost disbanded under the direction of the Judicial
Conference. That motion was only narrowly defeated. Do you know
why they were almost disbanded? Because they were viewed as too
activist. This Advisory Committee was viewed as too activist in the
eyes of some members of the Judicial Conference. That's what the
Advisory Committee means about operating within a conservative
process. How do you respond to that?
Rice: No, I don't think the Advisory Committee should be
abolished; now that we have codified the system of evidence rules,
there has to be some mechanism for getting the ball rolling for
changes. My only comment throughout this has been that the ball
ought to be rolling sooner on some of the issues. There have been
concepts tried under the initial Federal Rules of Evidence that were
marvelously successful. Article X' is the best example.
There have been other rules that have not been successful. We
have an entire Article of the Federal Rules that has not been touched
because Congress changed the concept of presumptions under
Article III to make presumptions follow the "bursting bubble"
approach. Now we have a situation where we don't know what
common law presumptions survive because the initial Advisory
Committee and Congress took the matter of presumptions away from
the common law judges and codified it. But, they created this
elaborate roadmap but build no roads; they haven't cited or created a
single presumption. Elsewhere in the code for authentication, they
talk about presumptions created by Congress where it is explicitly
mentioned...
Scallen: Paul, help us out here, as Oprah would say. Help us out
here.., because the problem I'm having is this: If the Advisory
Committee gets the ball rolling on any number of these issues,
including presumptions, the ball is going to roll but it is going to hit a
big, flat wall. It's going to stop. So what good is it if the Advisory
Committee believes everything you say and then they are told by the
Standing Committee and the Judicial Conference and ultimately the
Supreme Court: "Forget about it!"
Rice: Well, I think the Advisory Committee ought to be serving
in the role like a Republican advisor to a Democratic President22. FED. R. EVID. art. X (Content of Record, Writing, Recording, Photograph, Image
and Other Record).
23. FED. R. EVID. art. III (Presumptions).
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you're not there to be a "yes" person. You're there to try to give the
other point of view. You're there to try to start the ball rolling on
issues you have found that may create problems. And, if others, in
their wisdom, disagree-then a record has been made that the process
was started.
The one big problem with the system today is that when the
Advisory Committee doesn't take the action they should, every single
contested evidentiary issue is brought before a judge for a ruling. She
had no choice. She had to rule on it. Over time, then, the rules
started evolving. The Advisory Committee doesn't have to rule on
anything. As a result, issues can be left unaddressed for decades.
Scallen: Okay. I am back to you now, Judge Smith. But I'm
going to turn the tables. I'm going to work now with Paul here. Your
own reporter, Dan Capra, who I really wanted to be here and who
was terrific at helping me get this panel together-even though at
times it was against his own interest-Dan has written a report about
the divergence of case law from the codified rules. 24 I want to read to
you a couple of lines from Dan's report and see how you react to this.
It relates exactly to what Paul was saying. Dan says, and this also is
available on the Federal Judicial Center's website, downloadable and
also it is in the Federal Rules Decisions.
Dan Capra says, "The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules,
which this author currently serves as Reporter, has expressed concern
that the divergence between case law and the text of the Rule might
create a trap for the unwary." (I'm omitting citations).
Then Dan says:
One way to correct this divergence might be to propose an
amendment to the text of any Rule subject to divergent case law.
But the Advisory Committee is acutely aware of the costs of
amending an evidence rule-amendments can lead to the
disruption of settled expectations, and may create further problems
of interpretation and divergence.
The Advisory Committee resolved to take a less drastic course-a
course that would not require an amendment of any rules and yet
would highlight for lawyers and judges the existence of divergent
case law. The Committee directed the Reporter to prepare this
report in an effort to increase the awareness of counsel practicing in
federal courts, as well as judges, about the possibility that case law
has diverged from the text of some of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. This divergence comes in two forms: (1) where the case
law (defined as case law in at least one circuit) is flatly inconsistent
with the text of the Rule, the Committee Note explaining the text,
or both; and (2) where the case law has provided significant
24. Daniel J. Capra, Case Law Divergence from the Federal Rules of Evidence,
availableat http://www.fjc.gov and reprintedin 197 F.R.D. 531,533 (2000).
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development on a point that is not addressed by either the text of
the Rule or the Committee Note.
Professor Capra identified twenty-one different instances in
which the case law was flatly inconsistent with the text of the rules.
And Professor Capra found eleven potential new situations
unaddressed by the rules or Committee Notes.
Now, Paul kind of has a point when he says there is a lot of law
out there that the current rules don't handle very well. So, what do
we do about that?
Judge Smith: Well, one of the reasons you get divergence is that
the evidence rules leave enough room for judges to put in a certain
amount of subjective interpretation when equity requires.
I have read Professor Rice's article and, unfortunately, I got in
very late last night so haven't read it as carefully as I'd like. The
impression from that article is that the poor trial judges are caught in
this incredible bind, wanting to be common law judges but these rules
constrict them and hamper them. Well, as far as I know, that is just
not the truth. I shouldn't say the truth; it's simply not accurate.
But I have never felt incredibly hampered by the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Are there some I disagree with? Sure. I have never
heard my colleagues say, "oh, if only I didn't have to live with the
Rules of Evidence my life would be so much better." They just don't
feel that way because we do have room to move. Yes, there is
divergence and it's because there is room to move. So, you get the
11th Circuit saying yes, you get the 9th Circuit saying no, and the 4th
Circuit saying maybe. That's what the common law leads to. I don't
think that a thorough rewriting of the Federal Rules of Evidence
would change any of that. You'd have exactly the same problem.
I have to say one other thing. The ball doesn't roll more often
because the people who use these rules, the judges and the trial
lawyers, don't want the ball rolling. In the six years that I was on the
Committee, either as member or as the Chair-and Laird and Greg
and Ken can all disagree with me or add to this, which they have
shown they are very willing to do on numerous occasions-never did
anybody except Professor Rice's forty-five people on the Evidence
Project ever second his suggestions.
Now, if the rules are in such bad shape why doesn't the Litigation
Section of the American Bar Association say something? Why
doesn't the Evidence Section say something? Why doesn't the
Defense Research Institute say something? Or the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America? Nobody has come up and said, "you
know, Judge, you really ought to listen and you really ought to read
this because these rules are terrible." It just hasn't happened.
Scallen: Excellent point. It's a good segue. We are not leaving
either Paul Rice or Judge Smith for good. We will be back, I
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guarantee. But someone who had a seat at the table is Laird
Kirkpatrick. So, Laird, what is the role of the person in that seat?
The Department of Justice as well as the Federal Public Defender
have official or unofficial seats on the Advisory Committee-what are
the roles of those members?
Laird Kirkpatrick: Yes, the Department does has have a seat. I
was privileged to have the opportunity to serve as counsel to the head
of the Criminal Division during the last two years of the Clinton
administration. As part of my portfolio, I got to be the Department's
representative on the U.S. Sentencing Commission and on the
Committee that drafts the Rules of Criminal Procedure. And then, of
greatest interest to me, I was also the representative to the Evidence
Advisory Committee. So, I had a chance to work with Judge Smith,
with Greg and with Ken and the others on that Committee. It was a
fascinating process, after writing about evidence and teaching it a
number of years-as we all have in this room-to participate in the
rulemaking process.
I think the Department of Justice was given a seat on the
Evidence Advisory Committee, just as it is on the other Rules
Committee and the Sentencing Commission, because the Department
plays such a major role in federal court litigation. The Department of
Justice is a party of course to all criminal prosecutions and the
Department is a party to a very significant percentage of civil cases.
There are about 8,000 attorneys that work for the U.S. Department of
Justice. It's far larger than any law firm in the country. So it really is
an 800 pound gorilla as far as federal litigation is concerned. That's
why the views of the Department are solicited on things like proposed
evidence rules that could affect the work that the Department
attorneys are doing.
I was there in a representative capacity, as I indicated, so I didn't
have the freedom that Greg or Ken had, as a practitioner or as a law
professor, to simply state what I thought about the rules. I was there
to represent the views of these 8,000 attorneys. But, interestingly,
there was quite a bit of conflict in the Department on a lot of the
issues. Some branches of the Department do more plaintiff's work,
some do more defense work.
Even though I was with the Criminal Division, I had to consult
with all the other divisions in formulating the Department of Justice
posture with respect to the proposed amendments and to formulate
what recommendations we were making for new amendments. The
Environmental and Lands people often would favor, for example, on
Rule 701," a more liberal standard on lay witness testimony. They
sometimes would have their agents give testimony about pollution or
25. FED. R. EVID. 701 (Expert Testimony by Lay Witnesses).
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whatever they didn't feel was necessarily expert testimony. The Civil
Division wanted a very tough, tight standard on expert testimony
under 701 and 702.6 Even within the Criminal Division there was a
split on how tight the standards should be in these proposed expert
testimony rules, because prosecutors putting up police officers wanted
them to be able to say they smelled marijuana without automatically
turning that person into an expert witness on the smell of marijuana.
But if it was the defendant offering some kind of exotic syndrome
evidence, then in those situations the prosecutors would want a fairly
tough standard as to what was valid, scientific evidence. Often it was
hard for the Department to develop a consistent position given that
many of the attorneys are on different sides and have very different
perspectives of what a good rule should be.
I felt fortunate that, during the time I was there, the instructions
from the Attorney General were to urge whatever would be the best
policy-certainly to protect the interests of the Department of
Justice, but not necessarily to try to tip the table in favor of
prosecutors in every type of situation. I don't think that's always
been necessarily true in the past, but, at least fortunately for me, I
wasn't instructed just to always to take a position that would give any
type of advantage to the prosecutor with regard to the rules
amendments.
Is the process political? Certainly. Not only within the
Department of Justice in formulating rules but, particularly with
respect to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rulemaking process has
always been political. We know, as evidence teachers, that Congress
took an interest in the entire set of Federal Rules of Evidence and
vetoed what the Supreme Court had proposed under the Rules
Enabling Act. The Civil Procedure Rules basically went through
without congressional attention. The Criminal Rules went through
without congressional attention. But when the Federal Rules of
Evidence were promulgated, Congress stepped right in and vetoed
them, held up the effective date and wanted to go through the rules
one by one.
Scallen: Laird, I'm going to ask Greg about that in just a second.
I want to ask him why the Evidence Rules draw this fire-why do the
drafters of the Evidence Rules seem to not be able to get away with
things that the Civil Rules Committee can do willy-nilly. But that's
for Greg. Let me follow up with a question for you. It's a political
process; there's really conflicting policy interests all around. Judge
Smith has an excellent point that if there are these other issues
pending why haven't other groups brought them out? But, again, I
wonder whether it wouldn't be just easier if these various
26. FED. R. EVID. 702 (Testimony by Expert).
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stakeholders were sitting around the table with you on the Advisory
Committee? For example, there is a Department of Justice seat,
there's a Public Defender's seat-so why not a seat for the American
Trial Lawyers Association? Why not a Defense Research Institute
seat for balance? What makes the federal government so special here
in terms of the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence?
Kirkpatrick: Well, I think it is the amount of litigation that the
federal government does. I certainly wouldn't be opposed to an
expanded Committee. But, I think it is a matter of balancing the size
of the Committee with what is effective in Committee deliberations.
I think the theory is that public hearings will be held with respect
to any work done by the Committee. Certainly when the Committee
proposed the codification of Daubert and Kumho in Rules 701 and
702, those were the most well attended hearings-the plaintiffs'
lawyers came, the defendants' lawyers came. There was an enormous
amount of input.
Scalen: But then we have to go back to Professor Rice's pointthose public hearings only happen if the ball gets rolling on a
proposed amendment. The only time that the ball gets rolling is when
the Advisory Committee starts it rolling based on suggestions, etc. If
you're not at the table maybe you don't have quite as strong a voice
as you would if you were part of the group making the decision to
move the ball.
Kirkpatrick: Certainly, you can bring more people to the table
but I think many people who are at the table view themselves as
conduits of outside input. I assume that Ken, as a law professor, is
picking up on some of the criticism. Greg is representing the
practicing lawyers. So, I think the input comes through the people
who are on the Committee already.
Scallen: Right. Let's move the microphone down because I am
going to go to Greg next. I also know you want to get a word in here,
Ken.
Broun: I just wanted to follow up. I would agree with what
Laird has said. In the Committee, particularly before Laird arrived,
there were heated discussions often between Justice Department
people and people who had other points of view, including myself.
We lost some of those fights. Steve Saltzburg never got through his
2 7 amendment.
Bouraily
I never got through my anti-Luce?
amendment. But, we did win some as well.
I think there was a lot of give and take and there was a lot of
good intellectual discussion. There was a lot of feedback from other
sources. So I felt that there has been good representation. I thought
27. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
28. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
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some of the best discussions, and the best give and take, was on our
abortive attempt to stop the 413-415 character evidence rules. Judge
Winter even let me write the letter opposing that. He just took out
the expletives.
Joseph: One thing that is ironic, let me just end that last point.
Prior to Laird's appointment, Jim Robinson was on the Committee,
opposing Department of Justice initiatives. Jim then became the
Assistant in charge of the Criminal Division-and Laird's boss.
There are some ironies involved. I'm sorry, I just wanted to mention
that.
Scallen: No, no, I was just going to you anyway. So, let's talk a
little bit more about whether there is a special quality to the Evidence
Rules? I mean the Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended time
and time again in the last few years. But nobody is talking about, at
least as far as I know-we may hear otherwise during the comments
from the audience-nobody is talking about disbanding the Civil
Rules Committee, despite all the brouhaha over Rule 11, changing
backwards and forwards-and then Rule 26-mandatory disclosure.
The Evidence Rules were treated differently when they were adopted
as Laird said. And they still seem to get treated differently. What's
going on?
Joseph: I don't think it is a major insight to point out that the
Evidence Rules have a much more immediate impact on winning or
losing a lawsuit than the other rules. The Evidence Rules have much
more direct impact. Just think about the obvious examplessubsequent repair evidence under Rule 40729 for one. If that evidence
came in, doesn't that substantially increase the likelihood of a
plaintiff's verdict? And doesn't propensity evidence, if that were to
come in, significantly increase the likelihood of a conviction?
Time after time you can come up with examples of how the
Evidence Rules and the judgments that are reflected in the Evidence
Rules have a very immediate impact. That's reflected in the Rules
Enabling Act in two separate places. One section, which Ken is going
to be talking about with privileges, is Section 2074(b), which
specifically provides that any Rule creating, abolishing or modifying
an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved
by an act of Congress.
The general prohibition in Section 2072(b) against enlarging or
abridging rights is taken very seriously, particularly because people
have a stake in the outcome of trials. Billions of dollars change hands
every year because of the outcomes. I'm only going to speak in terms
of civil cases; I don't claim criminal expertise where personal liberty is
also involved.
29. FED. R. EVID. 407 (Subsequent Remedial Measures).
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Just think about Rule 407. That rule was amended in 1997,
because the 10th Circuit was the outlier circuit court saying that in
products liability actions, subsequent repair evidence could be
admitted. But that issue produced significant debate in the Advisory
Committee. Even making that change for obvious purposes of
uniformity affected rights. Changing the rule meant that plaintiffs in
the 10th Circuit were less likely to prevail with that evidence not
coming in. And the change passed in the Committee. There was
overwhelming support, but there were dissenters arguing that Rule
407 should not be touched because it does have a substantive effect.
Litigants-plaintiffs and defendants, institutions and individualshave settled expectations that can be very significantly disrupted by
major changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Now having said that, let me tell you that, at the same time from
a trial lawyer's perspective, it doesn't really matter what the rules are
as long as I know what they are ninety-nine percent of the time. I'm
sure you tell your students all the time there are basically three rules
of evidence: Rules 402, 403 and 611.3 Then there are things like the
"Hillmon Doctrine., 3' There are only a few rules that really matter.
The expert testimony rules provide an interesting situation. I
think it would have been irresponsible of the Advisory Committee to
attempt to reverse the Daubertdecision-putting aside that it would
have been idiotic-because it never would have happened. But once
the Daubertrule was articulated, it created settled expectations. The
Daubertrule happened to be, at least in its genesis, more liberal than
the Frye rule. The issue became gatekeeping. The one corollary to
what Judge Smith said about federal judges is that they make
mistakes-not all judges, not all the time, never Judge Smith, but
other judges make mistakes.
Judge Smith: Thank you for clarifying that.
Joseph: You can write the rules any way you want and judges
are still going to make mistakes. So, there are always going to be
disagreements. I don't know any federal judge who, if he or she
thinks a particular bit of evidence is important to a fair result, is going
to exclude that evidence.
I remember when I was appointed to the Committee, Margaret
Berger was the reporter. Margaret did a study and said she had
reviewed 30,000 cases over the past X years and seventeen or twenty30. FED. R. EVID. 402 (Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence
Inadmissible); Fed R. Evid. 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time); FED. R. EVID. 611 (Mode and Order of
Interrogation and Presentation).
31. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892)(codified by FED. R. EVID.
803(3)).
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seven had been reversed because of evidence reasons alone. Most all
of those were criminal cases.
So judges have a lot of latitude. I enjoyed Professor Rice's
article, which suggested that judges are constrained. The two
examples he gave were the Bock Laundry2 case, which was reversed
by the Advisory Committee's amendment, and Bourjaily, as to which
he said he could find no evidence that a change had been considered.
Steve Saltzburg lost that case not only in the Supreme Court but also
over three consecutive years in the Advisory Committee. Even those
that agreed with him were tired of hearing about Bourjaily by the
time we got through with Article VIII.33
Scallen: Greg, let me interject here. You have served as Chair of
the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association. When you
talk about what trial lawyers want, I listen. But when you say that
what trial lawyers want is to know what the rule is, I am somewhat
confused. The current Reporter for the Advisory Committee tells us
there are twenty-one current evidence rules where the text or notes
are flat out inconsistent with the case law in some circuits. Doesn't
this mean I can't trust the text of the rule to tell me what the rule
means?
Joseph: That's not correct. It does mean that, besides reading a
thirty-five page pamphlet, you might see how it has been construed.
People who get paid a lot of money to practice law are expected to do
more than just look at the text of the rule.
Scallen: Let me follow up with that. One of my scholarly
interests is the interpretation of the Evidence Rules-how those rules
get construed. The Supreme Court has said time and time again that
to construe the Federal Rules of Evidence we need only look to the
"plain meaning" of those rules.
Joseph: I hear the same thing about contracts. I've never seen it
stop a judge from looking at anything he or she wanted to in any
event. But when you look at the plain meaning, every time you make
a change to a rule, something in "the plain meaning" gets distorted.
I think of Rule 106' as a prime example of that. Nothing
happened to it but that it was gender neutralized. Instead of saying
that you may require him, the introducer, to introduce the other part,
now it says "may require the introduction." So, now there is an issue
of interpretation. Who gets to introduce the other part? Why do you
want to change these things? Every change is going to be argued
about because somebody will have an interpretation and a stake in
the outcome.
32. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
33. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII (Hearsay).
34. FED. R. EVID. 106 (Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements).
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Scallen: I have a great solution for you. Let's go back...
Joseph: Let's let forty-five second-year law students at
American University rewrite all the rules!
Scallen: No, no. It's easier than that-and cheaper. Let's just
get rid of the code. That was an option when the rules you mentioned
earlier were created. Recall when the desirability of codification of
federal rules of evidence were being debated, when the Uniform
Rules and the Model Rules were being debated by Professors Cleary
and others-way back when. One of the options at that point was to
have just the basic rules of relevance (now Rules 401 and 403). I
suppose they would also have loved to give the judges the discretion
they have under Rule 611. Let's just go back to that. Then you would
never have to worry about the consequences of amendments or new
rules. How about that?
Joseph: What problem, exactly, is eradicating the code going to
solve? We have already ascertained that the problem is not that
judges are too constricted. It's not one of putting people on notice of
basic principles. I'd like to know exactly what the change is going to
signify? Is it going to mean that we've changed the law of expert
evidence? Have we changed the new amendment to Rules 703 and
701? What have we done to Rule 404 5issues?
Everything you do in a rulemaking capacity has an effect. You
can't do it frivolously.
Scallen: So, don't make rules that way. Don't have a code-go
to a common law system of evidence.
Joseph: And what would that solve? Now that we've created
complete upheaval and nobody knows what the law is, it would
suggest that everything that has been developed under the Federal
Rules of Evidence is wrong. We could have a common law criminal
law system as well. We tried that until the late 1700s. There are some
advantages to codes even though there will always be case law
interpretations of codes.
Scalen: Well then let's talk about the advantages of codification.
Because Ken Broun is looking at a project where he would codify law
that is currently developed by the common law in the federal system.
You all know that federal rules of privilege were rejected when the
original "package" of federal rules was proposed in the mid-1970s.
Professor Broun is going to look into codifying those rules of privilege
once again. Well, talk about the political and other stakes-Ken, you
have quite a project on your hands. So, tell us about it.
Broun: Yes. Thanks, Eileen. One of the things that I start out
with in this project, and perhaps it may be a bit on the conservative
35. FED. R. EvID. 404 (Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct
Exceptions; Other Crimes).
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side for Paul but it is where I begin, is with some basic decisions that
Congress has made that I'm assuming are not subject to change.
Congress has decided, first, that "it" is going to enact privilege
rules, and will not allow the use of the Rules Enabling Act process. I
assume that is not going to change. Second, Congress has decided
that state privilege law would apply in those cases in which state law
provides the rule of decision, primarily in diversity cases. It has also
decided, however, that there is a federal law of privilege. That law, at
least under its present scheme, should be developed under the
common law process.
What I am proposing, and what I'm looking at through the
Advisory Committee, is the possibility of codifying that federal law of
privilege. Not changing the basic principle that the codification of
privilege law has to be adopted by Congress, not changing the
decision that in diversity cases, state privileges apply, but rather
codifying the existing federal law of privilege.
What I propose is a codification of what I would call the
"universally recognized" privilege law.
Exactly where that
recognition stops or ends, I think might be a bit of a problem, but I
think that we can all agree on many of the privileges that would be
included.
I also propose that, unlike the proposed federal privilege rules
that were proposed in 1969 by Ed Cleary's Committee, these rules of
privilege be open-ended. That is, the possibility would exist that a
court could recognize a new privilege: A court could recognize a state
privilege or could create a privilege theoretically that was
unrecognized in the states based upon common law principles (much
as the Supreme Court did in the Jaffe36 case). There could be
privileges that would not be codified that could in fact be recognized
by a court. I think that kind of flexibility is necessary.
I am hesitant to use the example, but the concept of Rule 807' is
a sound one-giving the courts the possibility of creating hearsay
exceptions. I'm not sure that they have always exercised that in the
way we would have liked, but that concept is a sound one and I think
we would include that with regard to the federal privilege.
I also see, and I know Eileen is interested in this question, an
ongoing process. I look at the process of developing these federal
rules of privilege through the Advisory Committee process. That's
how we started the project. The Advisory Committee is looking at
the possibility of privilege codification. It sees proposed codified
privileges going up through the Standing Committee, through the
Judicial Conference to the Supreme Court and then to Congress.
36. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
37. FED. R. EvID. 807 (Residual Exception).
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Now, unlike a normal Rules Enabling Act situation, Congress would
actually have to enact that codified privilege. I think that's not going
to change.
I would also expect that once, in this long process, there were
codified federal rules of privilege, that the amendment of those rules
would occur in exactly the same way. They could be amended; there
would be judicial interpretations of them. I can't imagine, just like
the drafters of the original Federal Rules of Evidence, that we would
get it absolutely right the first time. The courts are going to make
changes. Congress will make changes. The Rules Advisory
Committee will do it. But, I think that the process of the Rules
Advisory Committee is open, is diverse, is something that can
contribute greatly to the development of these rules. I see that
process continuing.
Joseph: There is one issue that we ought to be aware of and that
I have discussed with Ken. His paper is terrific, but there is a real
issue about Evidence Rules and opening the door to privileges in
Congress. Once you start with any privilege, you are going to have a
series of people coming in to ask for one. In New York we have a
social work privilege. You'll have a peer review constituency that will
want to have that privilege. Individuals doing corporate internal
investigations will want one. You'll be down to aromatherapists
wanting a privilege. You never know what is going to get passed.
Scallen: There's a problem with an "aromatherapist privilege?"
I want to also raise as an issue, after having Professor Broun's
draft: Ken, you've said here that in diversity cases state law privilege
would apply. But, there is the issue of supplemental jurisdiction?
What do you do when you have federal claims and state claims tried
together? Your draft argues, right now, that federal privilege should
apply. My question is, given the reality that any proposal on privilege
law ultimately has to go to the Supreme Court, and given the "state's
rights" bent of some of the justices on the current Court-putting that
pesky Bush v. Gore' thing aside-can you sell the idea that federal
law on privilege would control?
Broun: I'm not sure that I can sell anything, having been through
the process. But, let me respond to your question first and then I
want to say something about Greg's point.
The critical issue is the mixed state/federal case. Congress, when
it was considering the privilege rules, was terribly concerned about
what happens in a supplemental jurisdiction case. In fact, the courts
have had relatively little problem with the issue. There have been a
couple of cases that have said, well, this is a mixed case and state law

38. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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applies. But of the couple of dozen cases that have been decided,
virtually all have said federal law applies.
Usually it is in a situation in which the federal issues are clearly
dominant. Usually it is in a situation which is pro-admissibility.
Sometimes it is not. It strikes me that while the solution is not clear,
picking up on Greg's point, it is better to have a rule than not have
one. It seems to me that, in this instance, picking one of the two sets
of law makes sense. If there is enough reason to have a federal law of
privilege governing generally in federal cases, I think that there is
enough reason to have that governing in these mixed cases.
I part company somewhat from my friend Dan Capra on this
because Dan in his book39 suggests that there ought to at least be a
weighing process. My dissent from that is based upon the fact that a
balancing approach creates uncertainty in the privilege area. You
can't do it. It raises problems for the litigants that ought not to exist
in a privilege context.
As to Greg's point in terms of the politics of privilege, it is well
taken. You know you get politics in every privilege situation. I think
there were a dozen amicus briefs filed in the Jaffe case. All from
various psychology groups, social work groups and so on. So you get
pressures on the court. My thought is that if the Rules Advisory
Committee in its draft and in the proposals comes through with a set
of rules that deal with the universally recognized privileges-and
again there are some doubts to the boundary of those-if we do not
go into the more exotic privileges, I think we will avoid most of the
kinds of concerns that Greg is going to talk about.
You know there still are, even without a codification project,
proposals in each session of Congress for various kinds of privilege.
Part of my fear is that Congress will put in a parent-child privilege, or
a corporate self-evaluation privilege, without thinking about how that
privilege fits in the whole context of the law of privilege. That
bothers me more than the possibility that if we propose privilege
rules, there would be amendments sought once it got to Congress.
Scallen: What I want to do now, because I really do want to be
one of those sections that actually lets the audience talk, is provide a
chance for audience comments. Paul, do you want to come back? Do
you want to contribute something? Or, do you want to wait for the
audience questions?
Rice: Well, on the issue of privilege I have a particular interest
because of my scholarship in the attorney-client privilege area. It is
interesting if you are going to let judges change the rule. Are they
going to be allowed to change the existing attorney-client rule to
recognize an additional exception? The reason I ask that is because
39. Capra, supra note 24.
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California seems to be leading in law reform. They are usually ahead
of the curve.
The federal system, under the common law privilege, is now
ahead of California. In California, they have not legislatively enacted
the fiduciary duty exception. The California court, in the case I cite in
my footnote and can't read because of my eye, the California court
said this was a good idea but they don't have the authority to
recognize it.4 So, the federal system has actually faired quite well by
leaving this to the judges. Are you going to let the judges continue to
have the authority to do that, and if you let them have that authority,
then what purpose has codification served?
Broun: I think I would not leave it to the court to create
additional exceptions. I think I'm talking about flexibility with regard
to the recognition of new privileges. I would hope that we would
draft the rule carefully enough that we would deal with the exceptions
and with the actual application of the rule. I think it would be chaotic
to deal with in any other way.
As to whether we could change federal law as it exists, we can
propose anything. Whether it is likely to be accepted is quite another
measure. And there is the issue of whether we think it's a valid idea,
or whether the public, plus the Advisory Committee's analysis,
suggests it is a valid amendment.
Rice: Do you think that the fiduciary duty exception would ever
have been recognized had the privilege rules been adopted in 1974?
They had been left in the code. I doubt seriously if we'd even have a
fiduciary duty exception now with the restricted role that the
Advisory Committee is taking in actually adding things like this to the
rules.
Broun: I don't know. I don't know how things would have
developed. It would depend on how the court cases went, what the
scholarship said in the field-I think there's lots of reasons. I don't
take the view that the Committee has ignored clear trends in law and
scholarship. I think we have been very responsive to it.
Scallen: I want to interject just one point, Paul, because the one
useful piece of scholarship that I do have is my California Evidence
book which is thoroughly annotated. As Greg points out, you not
only have to know the text of the rule, you have to look at the case
law sometimes too. To me, the California Evidence Code is Exhibit
A for why you do not want a legislative body making Evidence Rules.
40. Wells Fargo Bank v. Super. Ct., 990 P.2d 591, 591 (Cal. 2000)(California Supreme
Court had no authority to create a "fiduciary" duty exception to attorney-client privilege
for communications between trustee and trustee's attorney as privileges are created only
by the California legislature). See also Dickerson v. Super. Ct., 135 Cal. App. 3d 93, 99100 (1st Dist. 1982) (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 403 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970)).
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There is a California Evidence Rule that talks about the admissibility
of animal testing on products. Now that is the kind of micromanagement and political input you get if you turn rulemaking over
to the legislature entirely.
All right, let me take the mike out to the audience. There have
to be questions. I have one in the back. I'm going to start back here
and move my way up front. Please for the people back home, identify
yourself for the tape.
Audience Questions
Kinvin Wroth: Thanks. Kinvin Wroth of Vermont Law School.
There is a constituency that has not been heard from, or about, much
today. It certainly doesn't have much of a seat at that federal table
that we've been talking about. That is, the rulemakers, trial judges
and trial lawyers of those fifty other jurisdictions out there. Thirtyfive to forty of which I'd guess (thirty-nine, thank you) have
something like the Federal Rules.
Several of the panelists used the term "code" a few times to
describe the Federal Rules. Once, way back there in the Ed Cleary
days, there was sort of a sense that we were creating a code in the
Napoleonic sense. Nevertheless, we see, particularly as Congress gets
into the act, more specific codification, in the Internal Revenue
Service sense, beginning to occur more and more with the Evidence
Rules. Every time something like that occurs in probably half the
states with something like the Federal Rules, a Rules Committee
jerks-and in the other half of the states the jerks on the Rules
Committee are asleep and nothing happens.
All of this is prelude to a question, I guess. Should the federal
rulemakers, in addition to all of the other concerns that have been
discussed this morning, continue to feel that there is some
responsibility for thinking of the law of evidence-through this
mechanism of codification-as a national body of doctrine and not
simply the rules of practice in the federal courts?
Scallen: Excellent question. Panelists?
Broun: Let me try to respond to that. I think that there is no
question that the Federal Rules are leadership rules. That the
adoption by thirty-nine states indicates that there is a great deal of
leadership that goes on by the adoption of the Federal Rules. I think
that it is important that the Federal Rules take into account in our
amendment and drafting the history of the existing rules, not only as
they have been applied in the federal courts but how they have been
changed and amended in the state courts as well.
But theoretically, the states have not adopted the Federal Rules.
They have adopted the Uniform Rules which are based upon the
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Federal Rules and the Uniform Commissioners have a seat on our
committee, or have representation on the committee. They are
involved. There was a state court justice who is always on our
committee. So, I think, there is great attention paid to what is
happening in the states and the impact that our rules may have on
future state adoptions.
One of the arguments that I make for the privilege codification is
that it would be useful to the states to have a better codification of
privilege law than existed at the time of the proposed federal rules on
privilege. In fact, the proposed federal privilege rules form the basis
of the rules of a large number of states, something like thirty states. I
hope that whatever federal rules on privilege are proposed, they
would also have an impact on state law.
Scalien: Let me go over to this gentleman and then we'll go over
to Myrna Raeder.
Stephen Burbank: Stephen Burbank from the University of
Pennsylvania. I have two comments. One is that I am looking
forward to reading Professor Broun's paper, because, not having
taught evidence for a long time but knowing a little bit about the
history of the Rules of Evidence, I am puzzled why it would be
proposed to codify universally accepted privileges. If they are
universally accepted, why do we need to codify them? I take it that
some of the comments earlier suggest that some of the aspects of
those privileges, such as exceptions to them, may not in fact be
universally recognized.
Moreover, I hope that nobody is laboring under the
misimpression, which has tended to be fostered by the Supreme Court
of the United States, that Congress made a principled choice in favor
of the common law method for federal privilege law. It did nothing of
the sort. It avoided a hot potato. I cannot imiiagine why it would not
want to avoid a hot potato in this instance as well.
It is true that timing played some small role in the decision, but it
was basically that, as Greg's comments suggested, they had social
workers after them, they had doctors after them. The same process
would predictably occur if legislation of the sort that I gather
Professor Broun has suggested were proposed. Congress again would
do what it does best-punt.
The second point concerns supplemental jurisdiction and what
law ought to apply with respect to state claims. I would suggest first
of all that Erie jurisprudence is totally irrelevant in answering that
question. And second, that there is a federal interest-it would seem
to me strong enough, combined with whatever interests might be
implicated by the precise privilege in question-a federal interest not
41. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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to have evidence admissible on one claim and not admissible on a
closely related claim, which could predictably confound juries-if not
judges.
Scallen: You know a little bit about the Rules Enabling Act,
right Steve?42 [audience laughter] Okay. Let me go over here to
Myrna.
Rice: Can I add a comment? It arises with respect to Professor
Broun's proposal. It seems as though with privileges, all types of
them, the law and people who propose revisions never look at the
policy underlying the privilege to determine which jurisdiction's law
should apply.
It has always been curious to me that if the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to get people to be candid at the front of
the process, then how can they possibly know where an action is going
to be filed? Whether it is going to be a state or a federal claim? Why
isn't state law always controlling when it comes to attorney-client
privilege? Then you would have the same decision whether it is a
state or federal claim that is being asserted. I don't see anybody even
considering that possibility.
Burbank: I think the question proceeds from, if not an erroneous
premise, then one that is skewed-as much of the analysis in the area
of privilege tends to be-by looking at the result of a law-making
decision, rather than ex ante at the process of choosing among, or
balancing among, competing policies. One such policy may be to
foster a relationship like the attorney-client relationship. Another
policy may be, to the extent that courts do this, actually to find the
truth. Federal courts do have an interest in being able to do that.
I take it that if it were the case that a privilege was recognized in
state law and not in federal law, it would be because the concern to
have that evidence admissible was thought-as a matter of federal
law-to outweigh the concern about the relationship. The concern to
have that evidence admissible is a concern that is very much a federal
concern, with respect to litigation in federal court of any sort. It is a
particularly strong interest when the substantive law claim is a federal
substantive law claim.
Broun: That's the point I was trying to make; I think that there is
a federal interest. I would also add, in response to Paul's remark, that
I do not view the utilitarian justification for the attorney-client
privilege as the only justification for it. I think that there are other
justifications based upon considerations of privacy and justifications
based upon loyalty. There are other considerations that are involved
42. Professor Burbank is the author of the leading scholarly piece on the Rules
Enabling Act. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1015 (1982).
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that are equally significant and cut across state and federal lines
pretty equally.
Scallen: Let me turn it over to Myrna.
Myrna Raeder: Hi. I'm Myrna Raeder, from Southwestern. I
wanted to follow up on something that Ken just raised-the role of
leadership concerning the states. At the beginning, the Federal Rules
certainly were the main model that the states followed. Yet when the
Uniform Rules of Evidence were revised in 1999, 4 the drafters made
a conscious decision not to follow the Federal Rules, because there
was a feeling that many of the congressional realities that we are
hearing about today have lead to the Federal Rules taking a more
conservative approach. You say, "if it's not broke don't fix it," but we
all will argue about how "broke" it has to be.
I would like the thoughts of the panelists on what now may be
perceived as real differences in some of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence that no longer pattern on the Federal Rules. And whether
you think states will be adopting those changes? Also, if states did
adopt the Uniform Rules changes, would that give the Advisory
Committee a greater sense of freedom to make changes that you felt
would not get you disbanded?
Joseph: I served as one of the ABA advisors to Uniform Rules
back in the mid-1980s. We made some changes that were not adopted
federally. I was never persuaded that the existence of the Uniform
Rules, except in a few distinct states where the commissioners had
real persuasive power, made all that much difference in terms of
enactment.
I will be curious to see how many adopt the Uniform Rules
version of the expert rules. Their attempt to deal with technological
evidence was reviewed by the Federal Advisory Committee and was
not followed. From my perspective, this was because their proposal
was not only superfluous but also had a lot of internal problems-like
creating so many different things that were all originals I didn't know
what a secondary thing was any more. But it will be interesting to see
whether the fact that the Uniform Rules Commissioners are asserting
themselves will affect evidence law in the states significantly.
Kirkpatrick: I just wanted to add something to Myrna's
comment. I think she is perceptive in noting that there is an
increasing divergence between the Federal Rules and state practice.
We talk about forty states having adopted the Federal Rules, but we
know that a number of states never adopted Daubert so they are
pretty unlikely to adopt the new Federal Rules 701 and 702. So there
is that divergence.
43. Uniform Rules of Evidence Act (Draft 1999), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ure/evidl200.htm.
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I think the states are struggling with the same issues that we are
talking about here. Do they have a mechanism to review their rules
once they are adopted? As a matter of history, I know many of you
were here ten years ago, but it was really this Evidence Section that
was the impetus to creating the Evidence Advisory Committee. That
was a major project of this Evidence Section, as some of you who are
in this room know-to press the Chief Justice to appoint that
committee. So, I think all of us have a real interest in the Advisory
Committee as a way of providing ongoing review to the Federal Rules
of Evidence. But some states don't have a procedure like that. Some
states have a way of automatically updating their rules, some have an
ongoing committee, but some states adopted the Federal Rules or the
Uniform Rules, as they were back in 1980, and have never looked at
them since. I think this is a struggle each state faces in addition to the
discussion we are having here.
Scallen: Professor McFarland has written about the "Hillmon
Doctrine."" Did I understand you correctly, Greg, that maybe you
don't think Hillmon is all that important? [Audience laughter]. I
don't know if you are going to talk about Hillmon, Doug.
Doug McFarland: Thank you Eileen. I was not going to talk
about Hillmon.[chuckling]. No, actually I wanted to make a comment
about the politics of the Advisory Committee. Professor Rice, I
think, suggests in his paper that the Chief Justice is kind of making
the Committee conservative by the appointments to that Committee.
It strikes me that some of Professor Rice's comments make the
Committee sound like any other committee where they don't want to
take on more work, rationalizing this decision with "if it ain't broke
don't fix it" and "we are going to deal with things that interest us as
individual committee members."
I did want to comment about the appointments to the Advisory
Committee which, of course, is a very political thing. I worked for
Chief Justice Burger for two years, and was present when he made a
committee appointment one day. It was very much like any other
situation where you go to appoint people to a conference or a
committee. He and the Director of the Administrative Office sat
there and I more or less listened. It was like, "well, who can we get
for this?" "Oh, well, this is a good person." "Oh really?" "Oh, okay,
how about this one?" It was a very much back and forth sort of thing.
It wasn't like, "who can we get that is reliable?"
My guess, from what I know of Chief Justice Rehnquist, is that
he is not going to be sitting there spending time batting names back
and forth. But I think as a practical matter, it is the Director of the
44. Douglas McFarland, Dead Men Tell Tall Tales: Thirty Times Three Years of the
JudicialProcessAfter Hillmon, 30 VILL. L. REV. (1985).
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Administrative Office, or perhaps even the Director of the Federal
Judicial Center who is suggesting names. Chief Justice Rehnquist is
more or less saying, "okay." I don't think that he is making the
Committee conservative.
Judge Smith: Can I respond to that? Thank you for your
perspective, professor. First, as to how the selection is made for the
Advisory Committee, it is in fact with a great deal of input from the
Administrative Office. But, it starts-at least from the judicial
representatives-with every federal judge basically getting a form
every year that says, "would you like to be on a committee and if so,
tell us what committee you'd like to be on." So, we volunteer for
things that we are interested in.
The other thing is that one of the only criteria that I know the
Chief Justice does have, and sticks to very firmly, is geographical
diversity. He basically goes through and makes selections from the
various circuits in turn. On the Evidence Committee, for example,
there is never more than one judge from one circuit and all the
circuits are rotated in representation." That alone gives some
diversity.
The other comment I'd like to make is that the final and most
critical review for any rule change is the Judicial Conference itself. I
tell you-I was the one who defended the proposed amendments to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and it was not an easy task. Some of
you sitting here may wish I had lost.
Scallen: Do you mean the recent expert testimony rule
amendments?
Judge Smith: Yes, the expert testimony changes and the Rule
10346 change. But the Judicial Conference is made up of the Chief
Judge from every circuit, plus an elected district judge representative
from every circuit-elected by the circuit and district judges of that
circuit.
So, the Judicial Conference is an incredibly diverse group. It
spans a number of appointment years, a number of different
philosophies, and as I say, the members of Judicial Conference are
probably the most critical review board of all. I think that does
45. Editorial note from Professor Scallen: Although a federal judge always serves as
the Chair of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, federal judges do not dominate the
membership of the committees. Academics and lawyers make up the majority of some
committees (such as the current Evidence Rules Advisory Committee) and are roughly
equally represented on other committees. For example, the current Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee includes four federal judges (including the current Chair of the
Committee). There are five other members of the Committee (including the Reporter),
none of whom are federal judges. The current membership of all federal rules committees
are listed on the federal judiciary's website http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/MembO2-02.pdf.
46. FED. R. EVID. 103 (Rulings on Evidence).
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suggest how extensive a role the Chief Justice personally does or
doesn't have in all of this process.
Scallen: I do think that you suggest in your paper, Paul, that the
Chief Justice has undue influence on this rulemaking process. Do you
want to respond to what Judge Smith just said?
Rice: Well, I appreciate the realities of how it is a back and forth
deal. But, the reality is that he makes the appointments. He has to
take responsibility for who ultimately gets on the Committee. It is
totally his. Nobody else has the power to say who will go on the
Committee.
I think it should be diversified. I think it should be diversified by
the geographical circuits and have someone from each one of them so
that no one person has, or could possibly have, so much input on the
development of legal principles.
Scallen: Would you get rid of the Department of Justice seat and
the Federal Defender's seat on the Advisory Committee?
Rice: I don't mind people being there on the Committee if they
don't have a vote. As long as there are sufficient public hearings and
everybody's position has been made clear and published so that other
entities can counter those positions-at least have some due process
on paper-I think it is fine. As long as the process is transparent, the
fact that you have a lawyer who is representing 8,000 people in the
federal government doesn't bother me. I guess I'm not sure I care a
whole lot about whether that person would be there or not. Because
they will have the right to be at public hearings too.
Chris Mueller: Chris Mueller from Colorado. I too have
noticed, as many of you have, that there is a greater resistance to
changing evidence rules than there is to changing civil rules. I serve
both on an Evidence Committee and a Civil Rules Committee in
Colorado and we change the Civil Rules twice a year, and more often
than that sometimes-very significant changes, too.
I have a slightly different explanation for why that is so than the
suggestion that effects outcome directly. I think the Evidence Rules
are more loosely textured than that the Civil Rules. Trial lawyers are
far more comfortable in an environment in which they can do their
song and dance and where the judge has some leeway in ruling on the
issues. Trial lawyers would be much less comfortable in an
environment that was much more extensively regulated. I think that
really is the difference.
I also think that law students and practitioners carry forward a
kind of mystical idea of the importance of evidence law. We succeed
as teachers better than we imagine in our fondest dreams. People
who, during our classes, are mystified by the hearsay doctrine become
admirers of the hearsay doctrine as soon as they finish the evidence
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course, and they have some confidence that they know what it means.
They defend the doctrine and are troubled by any departures from it,
There is one other point I wanted to make which is related to
some of the things that have been said here. I do think that
sometimes the state rules have something to say to the feds that they
ought to listen to. The Federal Advisory Committee has not been
doing as good a job as it should in listening to those insights. The
amendment to Rule 407 changed the law on product liability cases
making subsequent measures inadmissible. A great many states have
come out with exactly the opposite conclusion. I think the feds made
a mistake there. I think it creates a great area of disparity.
Unlike Steve Burbank, I think the Erie47 analysis does have a role
to play both in the area of privilege and in the area of subsequent
measures and in some other isolated areas. But my more general
point is that I hope the Federal Rules Advisory Committee will pay a
little bit more attention to state law than it does and not view that as
capitulation to some notion of states' rights or some other common
denigration.
Scallen: I know that the recent Rule 701 amendment was very
much based on state practice. So, sometimes a change does reflect
the way the states do it, but sometimes it doesn't. Rick Marcus.
Rick Marcus: Hi, I'm Rick Marcus. I teach at Hastings. I want
to say a word or two about the Civil Rules which, it has been asserted,
are amended willy-nilly without controversy and easily. [Audience
laughter].
Joseph: Much more commonly than the telephone book!
[Audience laughter].
Marcus: Well, first off, that comment by Greg together with his
earlier comment about how things always get screwed up if anything
gets changed: I think that underscores a reality for all rules
committees about being exceedingly cautious about unintended,
unforeseen, and undesirable consequences.
Second, in regard to the Evidence Rules, since I was there with
the Standing Committee when Judge Smith was, I think it is
remarkable to assert that the Committee wouldn't undertake things
that were controversial, given the controversy I saw there.
To revise things stem to stern because maybe they would have
been better if done a certain way, way back when, is really a dubious
undertaking. I call to your attention something called the re-styling
projects, which many jurisdictions undertake as to various sets of
rules, to improve their diction without allegedly changing their
47. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48. Richard Marcus was also a distinguished Advisor and Consultant on the Discovery
Rules Project of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.
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meanings. The Appellate Rules have already undergone that process.
It's not clear to me which set of rules is next. That might be an event
that calls for other kinds of stem to stern considerations.
Rice: We were accused of saying the Evidence Project was our
model evidence code-it wasn't. We approached the issue from
simply consistency-consistency within the rule and between the
rules, consistency with the theory of our adjudicatory process,
consistency with the Constitution.
The Project was really trying to get a public debate started about
issues in the Code that people have had problems with since its
enactment. Like this crazy assertive/non-assertive concept in Rule
801(a),49 about the definition of hearsay. There are a lot of issues that
simply need a public debate. We need more controversy about them
and discussion about it, rather than simply the Advisory Committee
saying, "well, we've reviewed the whole code once every so many
years, and we found insufficient problems to make corrections."
Their approach to looking at it is, the mantra that they use is-and
literally every person I talk to that had been or was on the Advisory
Committee independently used the phrase-"if it ain't broke, don't
fix it." But the history of Advisory Committee seems to be, "it ain't
broke if it ain't stopping traffic."
The point that you are making suggests the Advisory Committee
really shouldn't do revisions of one article after another, not all at the
same time. But we shouldn't try to make the code better over time.
As long as we're functioning with the rule, just leave it alone. So we
never get a better code if we take that attitude consistently.
All we were trying to do is get a debate started. I'd like to show
them my model code. It certainly wouldn't look like the rules we
have now. We were simply taking all of their assumptions, all of the
rules in place and saying, "is there a better way we might just look at
it-with your concepts in mind?" It wasn't stem to stem. We weren't
trying to do that.
Broun: Can I just respond on a couple of levels? First, I'll admit
that the Rules aren't drafted as artistically as they might be. But let
me say a word about the original draft of the Federal Rules. We all
have our quarrels with it, but that was a pretty damn good draft. Ed
Cleary was a teacher of mine." It was a pretty innovative draft, with
interesting concepts and has withstood the test of time pretty well.
Yes, there are things that are not great about it. There are things
which in hindsight we might do differently. There are things that
49. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (Hearsay Definitions, defining a "statement").
50. Edward Cleary was the Reporter and primary drafter of the original set of Federal
Rules of Evidence. Eileen A. Scallen, ClassicalRhetoric, PracticalReasoning, and the Law
of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1717 (1999).
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have needed amendment and things that don't sound quite so great
these days. But the essence of it is very solid. That is a good set of
rules, and Ed Cleary did an outstanding job on it.
Secondly, it is not simply a question of "if it ain't broke, don't fix
it." It is a question of when to remodel it. When you take this
basically sound format of the rules and change it, you are risking the
chances of misinterpretation. You're putting in new concepts. As
Greg suggests, simply the change in gender has put in some
differences in interpretation, things that were never intended. If we
start from the beginning and we draft the Rules the way that Paul
wants them drafted, we are going to run into a similar set of problems
and we are back to the beginning.
Rice: Well, I guess I would say that you can't make an omelet
without breaking eggs. There is going to be some potential for loss.
Risks have to be taken if we want things to be better. I dare say at
the time they originally drafted these rules in 1973, and adopted them
in 1974, that the concept of "duplicates" in Article X' was highly
controversial. 2 And, it has turned out to be life saving in the courts
because nobody raises best evidence rule problems anymore. They
are virtually gone. It turned out to be fabulously successful. They
took a risk with it and it worked. We need people willing to take
more risks on things that could be more efficient and save time for
lawyers and avoid unnecessary litigation in court.
Scalien: I will use my prerogative as Chair to ask whether there
are any last comments from all of you? Judge Smith?
Smith: I would just make a brief comment. Professor Rice just
said you can't make things better without taking risks. But I seriously
question, or want to ask, make things better for whom? You had
made a comment earlier about "the plain meaning rule." I would
submit that there is no such thing as plain English, having been a trial
lawyer and now having sat on the bench. If you say "drive slowly"
that's just two words, but what does "slowly" mean? What does
"drive" mean? As Greg, I think, pointed out: Every time you change
one word in a rule, it opens the whole thing up to new arguments.
At the Advisory Committee meetings, we would spend days
sometimes talking about if we were to change three words, would
people assume that meant A, or would they think it meant B, or
would they think we didn't like what we had done before. It's a very
51. FED. R. EVID. art. X (Contents of Writing, Recordings, and Photographs).
52. FED. R. EVID. 1002 (Requirement of Original), FED. R. EVID. 1003 (Admissibility
of Duplicates), and FED. R. EVID. 1001(d) ("A 'duplicate' is a counterpart produced by
the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography,
including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the
original.")
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difficult process. I understand, I think, what Professor Rice is saying
and I respect it, but I think from the standpoint of the people in the
courtroom that kind of undertaking would simply break far more eggs
than we have room for omelets.
Scallen: Well, on that food metaphor, we'll break for lunch.
[Audience laughter]. Thank you very much.

